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Abstract
For two decades Hungary, like the other Eastern European countries, followed a general policy of  
establishing and strengthening the institutions of  democracy, rule of  law, and a market economy 
based on private property. However, since the elections of  2010, when Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz 
party came to power, Hungary has made a dramatic U-turn. This article investigates the different 
spheres of  society: political institutions, the rule of  law, and the influence of  state and market on 
one another, as well as the world of  ideology (education, science and art), and describes the U-turn’s 
implications for these fields and the effect it has on the life of  people. It argues against the frequent 
misunderstandings in the interpretation and evaluation of  the Hungarian situation, pointing out 
some typical intellectual fallacies. It draws attention to the dangers of  strengthening nationalism, 
and to the ambivalence evident in Hungarian foreign policy, and looks into the relationship between 
Hungary and the Western world, particularly the European Union. Finally, it outlines the possible 
scenarios resulting from future developments in the Hungarian situation.
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Reményi, and Éva Szalai for their thoughtful and attentive assistance, and to Dóra Kalotai and 
Christopher Ryan for their careful translation of  the Hungarian original. I express my gratitude to 
Corvinus University of  Budapest for the inspiring environment that it provides, and to “A Gondolat 
Erejével” Alapítvány (“By Force of  Thought” Foundation) for its financial support of  my research.
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Hungary is a small country, poor in raw materials, with a population of  only 10 million. No 
civil wars are being waged on its territory, nor are there any popular uprisings or terrorism. It 
has not become involved in any local wars, and it is not threatened by immediate bankruptcy. 
So why is it still worth paying attention to what is going on here? Because Hungary, a coun-
try that belongs to NATO and the European Union, is turning away from the great achieve-
ments of  the 1989–1990 change of  regime—democracy, rule of  law, freely functioning civil 
society, pluralism in intellectual life—and attacking private property and the mechanisms of  
the free market before the eyes of  the whole world; and it is doing all this in the shadow of  
increasing geopolitical tensions.
1. Shifting away from democracy, rule of  law, private property and civil 
society; the obsession with centralization
Let us consider the ensemble of  the following countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All of  these now-independent countries 
reached a crucial turning point in 1989–1990. Prior to these years, they had functioned as 
independent states or as separate parts of  states within the socialist system, ruled by the 
Communist party. The structure and pace of  the transformations varied from country to 
country. Severe failures occurred in all of  them, including Hungary; one step forward was 
often followed by a period of  regression. However, despite the colorful variations, until 2010 
the countries all moved in the same general direction: progress towards market economy based 
on the dominance of  the rule of  law and of  private ownership.
	 Hungary	 is	 the	first,	 and	 so	 far	 the	only,	member	of 	 this	 group	of 	 15	 countries	
which has performed a sharp U-turn and set off  resolutely in the opposite direction. In the 
2010 elections the coalition formed by Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance with the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (henceforth Fidesz for short), led by Viktor Orbán, won a land-
slide victory. Thus began the turn.1
By 2010 Hungary had established the fundamental institutions of  democracy—how-
ever, with the U-turn their systematic destruction started. It has already been completed to 
a	significant	degree.
In actual practice the executive and legislative branches are no longer separate, as 
they are both controlled by the energetic and heavy hand of  the political leader who has po-
sitioned himself  at the very pinnacle of  power: Viktor Orbán. No worthwhile preparatory 
work on bills is being done either within or outside the walls of  Parliament. Parliament itself  
1 A few months after Fidesz took over the government I wrote an article entitled “Számvetés” (Taking 
Stock—published in Hungarian in 2010; for the English translation see Kornai 2011),which gave a 
summative overview of  the main characteristics of  the changes that had already taken place and which 
could be expected. The volume of  literature on Hungarian changes is increasing year by year; it is mainly in 
Hungarian. I would like to single out the collection of  studies in two volumes edited by Bálint Magyar and 
Júlia	Vásárhelyi	(2013,	2014),	which	contain	essays	by	several	eminent	Hungarian	experts	in	the	field.
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has turned into a law factory, and the production line is sometimes made to operate at unbe-
lievable speed: between 2010 and 2014 no less than 88 bills made it from being introduced 
to being voted on within a week; in 13 cases it all happened on the same or the following 
day. (Scheppele 2012, European Parliament 2013). Without exception, every single attempt-
ed investigation of  the background of  a scandal that has just broken, which would have 
been carried out objectively by a parliamentary committee with the effective involvement of  
the opposition, has been thwarted. “Reliable” people close to the centre of  power occupy 
decision-making positions even in organizations which are not legally under the control of  
the executive branch and which, in real democracies, should serve as a counter-balance to 
monitor the executive and legislative branches: in the constitutional court, the state audit 
office,	the	fiscal	council,	the	competition	authority	(the	office	in	charge	of 	enforcing	pro-
competition	laws),	the	ombudsman’s	office,	and	the	central	statistical	office.
The basic institutions of  the rule of  law had emerged by 2010; however, since 
the	U-turn	 they	 have	 been	 abolished	 or	 significantly	weakened	 (Bozóki	 2013).	 The	 new	
Hungarian constitution, replacing the constitution accepted by multi-party consensus in 
1989, was drafted by a small group within Fidesz, and no wide public discussion ensued. All 
protests were completely ignored, and the document was dragged through the defective fil-
ters of  the law factory in very short order. The text abounds with shortcomings, which were 
pointed out immediately (and in vain) by both local and foreign legal experts (Scheppele 
2013, Halmai 2014). It contained so many clauses serving the immediate political purposes 
of 	 the	people	 in	power	 that	 the	document,	officially	called	“Fundamental	Law,”	has	had	
to	be	amended	five	times.	In	2011–2013	the	Fundamental	Law	was	complemented	by	the	
passing of  32 so-called “cardinal laws,” which future parliaments will be able to modify only 
by a two thirds majority. This collection of  laws covers crucially important aspects of  the 
country’s life.   
 One of  the fundamental principles of  the rule of  law is that no-one, not even those 
who hold the most power, should be above the law. The law must be respected. In Hungary, 
the situation has changed: the holders of  power are able to elevate any decision to the status 
of  law quickly and without hindrance, at the push of  a button. They pass retroactive laws, 
disregarding the prohibition of  such legislation which goes back to Roman times. If  they 
wish to arrange especially generous treatment for an individual or an organization, they pass 
laws using legal tricks which ensure de facto favoritism.
 Moving on to the juridical branch of  the state, the Prosecution Service is a central-
ized organization in Hungary. In theory, it operates independently from the rest of  the gov-
ernment. In practice, however, and that is what is important, the chief  prosecutor is chosen 
by the holder of  supreme power, after which there is a purely formalistic appointment by the 
parliament,	which	from	then	on	is	unable	to	effectively	control	him.	With	a	few	insignificant	
exceptions, the investigation of  all public scandals and cases of  corruption involving indi-
viduals close to the present government party has failed to progress beyond the investigative 
or prosecution phases. The Prosecution Service has, on the other hand, brought its full pow-
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ers to bear on other economic scandals and cases of  corruption in which people belonging 
to the current opposition are implicated. Dramatic, spectacular arrests are carried out for the 
benefit	of 	the	cameras,	which arrive in droves. Compromising facts are often leaked while 
investigations are still in progress. No effort is spared to make sure that these cases come 
to court, though it is true that all too often charges have to be dropped in the prosecution 
phase,	for	lack	of 	sufficient	evidence;	in	other	cases	the	charges	are	rejected	by	the	court.	
And it is noticeable that the timing of  a leak, the bringing of  charges, or a court hearing 
coincides frequently with some event on the political calendar: the mine that will destroy a 
rival’s reputation is detonated just before an election.
	 We	seem	to	be	witnessing	a	definite	attempt	by	the	ruling	political	group	to	take	con-
trol over the courts as well. The President of  the Supreme Court, who had been appointed 
before 2010, was dismissed early, before his mandate expired. A new institution emerged, 
the	National	Office	for	the	Judiciary,	which	from	the	very	start	acquired	exceptionally	wide	
powers: not only to appoint judges, but also to decide which cases should be heard by which 
courts. Later, as a result of  protests in Hungary and from abroad, the sphere of  authority 
of 	Office	was	reduced,	but	 its	 influence has	remained	significant.	The	retirement	age	for	
judges was conspicuously reduced from age 70 to 62, below the average age limits, with the 
result that the older generation was expelled. This affected several judges in leading positions 
within the judiciary system who had been appointed before the present ruling group came 
to power, and although this measure was subsequently annulled by the relevant international 
court, so that the people involved obtained at least moral redress, most of  them were not 
able to return to their previous leading positions.
 Numerous members of  the judiciary are unable to escape from the intimidating ef-
fect	of 	the	government’s	measures.	Some	cases	which	come	to	court	have	political	ramifica-
tions,	and	impartial	experts	in	the	field	believe	that	some	judgments	are	biased	in	ways	that	
favor Fidesz policies. Nobody ventures to express an opinion about the number of  cases 
involved. What is sure, however (and encouraging), is that the ruling regime has not man-
aged to subjugate the judiciary to the same extent as they have done in other spheres.
 By 2010 private rather than state ownership had become the dominant form of  owner-
ship. Since the U-turn, however, private property has become the target of  frequent legal, 
economic	and	ideological	attacks;	the	weight	and	influence	of 	the	state	sector	is	rising	again.	
The	nationalization	of 	private	pension	funds	financed	from	the	obligatory	contributions,	
which was carried out using unique legal tricks, dealt a heavy blow to the principle of  re-
spect for private property. A similar form of  indirect nationalization took place in the sector 
of 	savings	and	loan	cooperatives.	The	state-owned	sector	has	expanded	significantly	in	the	
branches of  banking, energy, public works, transportation, the media and advertising. In 
these	areas	the	harsh	means	of 	disguised	confiscation	were	not	so	often	applied:	property	
rights were bought instead. In many cases the previous owners were forced into a position 
where they felt they had no other option but to sell their property to the state, and at a price 
well below its market value.
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 Up to 2010, decentralized mechanisms played an increasing role in the coordination of  
various activities. However, since the U-turn the tendency to centralize has become notice-
ably stronger.
 This is primarily true of  government administration. One of  the major achieve-
ments	of 	the	change	of 	regime	was	a	significant	increase	in	the	powers	of 	local	government.	
The most obvious sign of  regression is the fact that schools and hospitals no longer belong 
to local authorities, but are run from the bureaus of  the central government. It is unprec-
edented—even on a world scale—that a misshapen bureaucratic giant has emerged, making 
decisions	about	staffing,	curricular,	and	financial	matters	in	thousands	of 	schools	over	the	
heads of  teachers, parents and local governments.
 The obsession with centralization, which is intertwined in many ways with the afore-
mentioned tendency to nationalize, affects almost all spheres of  society: more and more 
questions are decided at the highest level. A pyramid-like vertical hierarchy has emerged 
and	solidified,	with	the	supreme	leader	at	its	summit.	Below	him,	ready	to	obey	his	every	
command, stand his hand-picked henchmen, who owe him unconditional loyalty. Moving 
on	down,	we	find	the	next	level	of 	the	pyramid,	and	the	next:	for	each	position	people	are	
chosen for their loyalty to the regime. Commands which take obedience for granted tightly 
bind each subordinate to his or her superiors. It is only the leader at the top who does not 
depend on his superior, only those at the very lowest level do not give orders to anyone. 
Everyone else incorporated into the levels in-between is simultaneously servant and master. 
It is in their interests to hang on in there, to move further up in the pyramid. Their position 
is not decided at elections, but depends on winning the trust of  their superior by services 
and	flattery,	or	at	least	by	uncritical	obedience.	Hundreds	of 	thousands	of 	public	employees,	
including those who work in the state-run educational and health sectors, feel defenseless: 
few dare to speak up, to protest, because they fear for their jobs. The regime is robust, partly 
because it can surely count on the fear of  the majority of  people dependent on it, as well as 
on	the	“keep	a	low	profile	and	obey”	mentality.
 A very important decentralized mechanism is represented by civil society, comprised 
of  a number of  non-market based organizations and associations outside the control of  
state bureaucracy. In twenty years these have developed too, and have also become a means 
of 	scrutiny	without	which	it	would	be	impossible	to	expose	and	fight	abuses	of 	power.	One	
manifestation of  the U-turn is the methodical harassment of  civil society. When parliamen-
tary bills are being drafted trade unions and other relevant organizations are not consulted. 
Or, if  the people concerned express their point of  view through declarations or demonstra-
tions, their voices are disregarded. The indignant protest of  the Norwegian government 
against the Hungarian government’s plans to interfere in their generous offer of  assistance 
to Hungarian civil society is widely known.
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2. The relationship between state and market: a distorted symbiosis
When describing the coordinating mechanism of  economic activities we cannot apply the 
metaphor of  the U-turn: it would be more precise to call it a half-turn. Market mechanisms 
became	 dominant	 in	Hungary	 in	 the	 first	 two	 decades	 after	 the	 change	 of 	 system,	 and	
remained so even after 2010. Just as before, state and market continue to coexist in a sym-
biosis: there is no modern economy where these two social formations would not coexist 
and exert reciprocal effects. Every sensible economist is convinced that the state cannot be 
a	passive	observer	of 	market	processes;	the	state	must	set	legal	limits,	regulate	the	financial	
sector	and	certain	prices,	and	interfere	in	the	distribution	of 	income;	it	must	influence	pro-
duction through appropriate macro-economic policies, and so on. The problem is that the 
inevitable co-existence and interaction of  state and market have been seriously distorted in 
Hungary; symbiosis is subjected to political interests. The change that Viktor Orbán’s re-
gime introduced is that now the state impinges on the economy in a much more aggressive 
fashion than did the governments before 2010: it exerts more efforts to rule over it. This is 
done in many ways.
 We are not talking about a case of  “state capture” carried out by a small group of  
oligarchs in order to establish regulations and pass measures in their own interests. The di-
rection of  the process is the reverse. Orbán and the people who are close to him at the peak 
of  political power decide who should become an oligarch, or who should remain an oligarch 
if  he already is one, and how far his sphere of  authority should extend. Something similar 
takes place at lower levels, too. The natural selection of  market competition is overwritten 
by political considerations. “The important thing is that our man should win the public 
procurement tender, get permission to run a tobacconist’s or a casino, obtain tenure of  that 
state-owned piece of  land.” Tobacconists, casinos and land tenure all work on capitalist 
principles, but at the same time clientelism, a kind of  feudal master-servant dependency, is 
asserted between the politician/bureaucrat and the capitalist entrepreneur.
 A new term has been introduced into everyday Hungarian: “Fidesz-közeli cég,” 
meaning	“a	near-to-Fidesz	company.”	Such	firms	do	not	belong	to	the	party,	but	the	sole	
or principal owner of  the company is a crony of  the political center. Maybe the association 
began a long time ago, at university or when the party was founded; or an individual’s career 
may have included a succession of  political, bureaucratic and business activities. “Crony 
capitalism” evolves. The intertwining of  the worlds of  business and politics is a global 
phenomenon, and provides fertile soil for corruption everywhere. What comes on top of  
this in Hungary is the social environment created by the aforementioned U-turn: the very 
organizations	which	should	be	fighting,	with	the	authority	of 	the	state	behind	them,	against	
the entanglement of  business, politics, and government and against corruption are not inde-
pendent: they themselves are cogs in the same machinery. A corrupt politician or bureaucrat 
knows that his powerful political friends will protect him − unlike the “whistleblowers,” who 
take	personal	risks	to	unveil	corruption.	The	latter	are	not	sufficiently	protected,	but	often	
harassed, often becoming victims of  “character assassination” campaigns.
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Viktor Orbán and those who implement his economic policies are swift to emphasize 
that if  the state needs more revenue this will not be a burden for the people, and there will 
be	no	“austerities.”	The	new	tax	will	be	paid	by	companies,	out	of 	their	profits.	The	word	
“profit”	itself 	has	as	negative	an	undertone	as	it	did	in	the	good	old	days	when	Marxist	po-
litical economics was an obligatory subject for study. In addition to the usual forms of  taxa-
tion, special supertaxes have been used to pillage whole sectors, including banking, telecom-
munications, insurance, and household energy supply. The effect of  special taxes contributes 
to	the	fact	that	the	volume	of 	investments	by	private	companies	financed	from	their	profits	
stagnates or barely increases. An unpredictable tax policy, legal uncertainty, and anti-capital-
ist rhetoric discourage the “animal spirits”: the propensity towards private investment. The 
extra-ordinary tax burden ensures that the budget is balanced, which is reassuring for the 
international organizations and credit rating agencies that are extra-sensitive to this indica-
tor, but it does undermine extremely important factors promoting growth and technological 
development. Moreover, it is not true that the extra burden affects only the companies, as 
they pass the extra costs on to the consumers whenever possible.
 While companies are held to ransom, the individual tax burden based on dividends 
has	been	significantly	reduced.	One	of 	the	first	measures	introduced	by	the	Fidesz	govern-
ment	was	the	abolition	of 	progressive	personal	income	tax,	which	was	replaced	by	a	flat	rate	
of  16 percent, while at the same time value added tax was raised to an unprecedented 27 
percent. It is well known that in relation to the income of  a given household, these tax rates 
impose a much greater burden on the living standards of  people with low incomes than on 
those who earn more. Government propaganda proclaims as a great achievement the reduc-
tion of  household expenditure on utilities through price-cap regulation. In reality, this price-
capping	policy	is	far	more	beneficial	for	the	rich,	as	the	bigger	the	flat,	the	more	electricity,	
gas and water it uses, and the more rubbish it produces, the more it saves. We are all too 
familiar	with	the	consequences	of 	artificially	depressing	prices	from	the	days	of 	socialism.	
Companies make a loss, which in the end has to be scraped together by the community of  
tax-payers.
 Restricting the functioning of  the price mechanism is an important feature of  the 
general phenomenon which has just been discussed: the state leans heavily on the private 
sector,	using,	among	other	means,	administrative	micro-interventions,	fine-tuning	of 	con-
trol, and excessive regulation. Every economist who has studied the theory of  market failure 
knows that appropriate regulation and well-aimed intervention can correct many problems 
caused by an uncontrolled market mechanism. This theory, however, at least tacitly sup-
poses that the state is at the service of  public interests, and that regulation is carried out 
professionally and without bias. What happens if  the levers of  regulation are seized by 
incompetent or even corrupt people? What happens if  a state whose masters use the state 
mechanism to preserve their own power interferes in the economy? Such interventions hap-
pen so frequently and affect the coordination process of  the economy so deeply that sooner 
or	later	the	half-turn	can	become	a	U-turn	in	this	field	as	well.	The	Hungarian	developments	
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should serve as a warning for all those who insist unconditionally on increasing the role of  
the state, on extending and strengthening regulations, without emphasizing the accompany-
ing dangers.
 Fidesz’s economic policy cannot win the approval of  the conservative economist 
because of  the upheaval that it causes in market mechanisms and the way it threatens pri-
vate property. At the same time, it arouses the rightful indignation of  the liberal economist 
who is sensitive to injustice in the distribution of  income—and not only because of  the tax 
policy mentioned above. The adherents of  Keynesian economic policy must not let them-
selves be deceived by aggregate employment statistics. The revival following the depression 
is dragging its feet, the private sector is creating few new workplaces. The growing number 
of  people in “public work” is supposed to make up for this. But they are employed for rock-
bottom wages, 31-33 percent of  the average salary, under degrading circumstances; they are 
not guided into the employment market this way, on the contrary, they are deprived of  the 
possibility to look for work and kept permanently in their humiliating condition. Poverty and 
social exclusion are increasing at a dramatic rate. Enlightened societies would never tolerate 
the tone of  voice that is used to stigmatize the poorest, or the way the homeless are chased 
out of  cities by mayoral decree.
	 Any	attempt	to	squeeze	the	classification	of 	the	Hungarian	government’s	economic	
policy into boxes labeled “right wing” or “left wing” is off-track. There is no question of  
the government intending to restore the socialist system, even though some phenomena are 
surprisingly reminiscent of  the socialist era. The Orbán regime is not only compatible with 
capitalism, but each member of  the power pyramid uses the opportunities offered by capi-
talism to their own advantage. When they launch an attack on banks or other sectors, they 
immediately conclude a special deal with this or that bank, sign “strategic agreements” with 
this or that large company in front of  television cameras. “Divide and rule!” Instead of  the 
left-right division, let us put the economy into another kind of  spotlight: what best serves 
the survival of  the existing power structure, the power of  the central will, the interests of  
the	higher	levels	of 	the	power	pyramid,	including	their	financial	interests?	Suddenly	it	all	falls	
into place and we know why this new institution or that new law has emerged.
3. Intellectual fallacies and misunderstandings
Hungary’s friends abroad—intellectuals, journalists, political and economic analysts, diplo-
mats and politicians who take an interest in the happenings here—do unintentionally fall 
into various traps or misunderstandings. One of  these is to overestimate the value of  the 
letter	of 	the	 law	(Bozóki	2012,	Bugarič 2014). At one point, the Fidesz government cre-
ated a law which failed to guarantee the complete independence of  the central bank. Not 
only the media, but also the competent international organizations exerted pressure on the 
Hungarian	state	to	change	the	 law.	This	finally	happened.	Those	who	had	demanded	the	
change felt they had achieved success. The propagandists in Budapest used it to illustrate 
how	flexible	and	ready	to	compromise	the	Hungarian	government	is.	In	reality,	what	hap-
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pened	to	the	law	was	irrelevant.	Having	resigned	from	his	position	as	minister	of 	finance	
György Matolcsy, who the prime minister publicly dubbed “his right hand,” stepped out of  
the ministry, walked a few hundred yards and entered the doors of  the Hungarian National 
Bank, as its theoretically independent governor (Barnes and Johnson 2014). Without excep-
tion, every single member of  the highest body of  the central bank, the Monetary Council, 
was hand-picked by the supreme leader and his advisors; they are all loyal members of  the 
consolidated machinery of  power.
 According to the letter of  the law, every single selection process conforms to various 
seemingly neutral legal regulations. For example, for one position the current Prime Minister 
nominates a candidate, the competent parliamentary committee expresses an opinion, and 
he is appointed by the President of  the Republic. For another position the parliament not 
only	expresses	an	opinion	about	the	candidate,	but	also	makes	the	final	choice.	Does	this	
matter? The parliamentary committee, the majority of  the complete session of  parliament, 
and even the President of  the Republic are all cogwheels in the same machinery of  power.
 Another important example is how the regime leans on the press, television, radio 
and other means of  telecommunication. This is about nothing less than the independence 
of  the “fourth branch of  power,” the liberty of  one of  the most important checks and 
balances in a real democracy. The competent bodies of  the European Union and the inter-
national press dwelled at length upon the question of  whether the rights allocated to the 
centrally appointed media authority were excessive or not. Finally, a few regulations of  the 
law on the media were amended. The critics considered this a victory. Viktor Orbán and his 
colleagues, however, knew perfectly well that it was irrelevant. What really mattered was the 
fact that they had put their own people in charge of  all television channels and radio sta-
tions	owned,	controlled	and	financed	by	the	state,	who	then	purged	their	staffs	and	turned	
all of  them into the collective mouth-piece of  government propaganda. The government 
or near-to-Fidesz entrepreneurs seized the freely distributed and very popular advertising 
broadsheets and other free local media products. The state media are obliged to use mate-
rial provided by the news agency controlled by the government. This is not obligatory for 
the country’s privately owned media, but the latter are offered new state-produced material 
free of  charge, while purchasing news from independent international agencies or trawling 
the foreign press is expensive. It is hardly surprising that they are reduced to using the free 
material. Self-censorship, a form of  behavior all too familiar from the communist era, is 
becoming widespread.
 There are newspapers, television channels, and radio stations that are both indepen-
dent and critical of  the government. This is very important; it is part of  the impartial de-
scription of  the present Hungarian situation. However, their functioning faces many obsta-
cles—such as during the distribution of  broadcasting frequencies, when licenses are granted. 
Their main source of  revenue is advertising, but  the government’s own agencies, as well as 
private companies which wish to maintain friendly relations with the political masters, re-
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frain from advertising with them. Political bias manifested in the advertising market has been 
compounded by a discriminative advertising tax piled on top of  the existing corporation tax.
 No matter how hard the authorities try to subdue the organizations which form pub-
lic	opinion,	the	IT	revolution	has	made	their	task	more	difficult.	Stalin	was	able	to	surround	
his empire with almost impenetrable barriers, but nowadays this is impossible: computers, 
tablets and mobile phones connect the individual with the world, and hundreds of  thou-
sands can express their opinions and organize themselves on social networking sites. The 
Fidesz	government	would	love	to	find	a	way	to	prevent	this	too.	Not	long	ago	it	proposed	
the introduction of  an internet tax. Each gigabyte data transfer would have been taxed to 
the	tune	of 	150	forints	(roughly	55	USD	cents).	Within	a	few	days,	mass	demonstrations	had	
been organized; images of  the protesters circulated in the international press. Viktor Orbán 
retreated half-way: as I write these lines it is not yet clear if  the plan has been abandoned for 
good or merely postponed. Whatever may happen, the image of  tens of  thousands of  dem-
onstrators raising their mobile phones to the sky has become a symbol. The light from the 
tiny	screens	might	even	have	illuminated	the	clouds	of 	the	internet—	it	will	prove	difficult	
for	any	regime	today	to	raise	impassable	barriers	to	the	flow	of 	free	speech.
 Here is another frequent intellectual fallacy: certain recently established Hungarian 
institutions, or new procedures that have been introduced lately, are similar or even identical 
to	the	parallel	institutions	or	procedures	of 	a	traditional	Western	democracy—at	first	sight.	
Many changes have been made in the Hungarian judicial system. What is wrong with that? 
After all, even after these recent changes, in many ways it still resembles the systems of  some 
European countries. The tobacco trade used to consist of  small shops competing with each 
other. Now only the government is allowed to issue a license for the sale of  tobacco. What is 
wrong with that? After all, in Sweden a state monopoly with similar or even greater powers 
covers the trade in alcoholic beverages.
 What we have is a mosaic, many pieces of  which are original Hungarian products, 
while others have indeed been imported from democracies abroad. However, if  we look 
at the mosaic as a whole, the outlines of  Viktor Orbán’s Hungary emerge. It is actually bet-
ter to move away from the static image of  a mosaic to represent the relationship between 
“part”	and	“whole.”	It	is	not	a	fixed	state	that	we	have	to	interpret,	but	a	dynamic	process.	
What we have to recognize is the direction that has been followed by each small component 
of  the machinery since the starting point in 2010. From then on, at every new change, we, 
the observers, must notice which direction the change has taken. In the US, the mandate of  
the members of  the Supreme Court lasts for the rest of  their lifetime. There, this regulation 
has emerged within the framework of  a stable democratic order, with many checks and bal-
ances	in	operation.	In	Hungary,	on	the	other	hand,	for	the	first	time	now	the	overwhelming	
majority of  members of  the Constitutional Court were chosen by the current prime min-
ister—and soon all the members, without exception, will be Viktor Orbán’s nominees. If  
their mandate is extended right now, this move, along with other similar moves, will shift the 
legal status of  the country towards irreversible power relations. Thousands (yes, the number 
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is no exaggeration) of  discrete changes, all moving together in the same direction, create 
a new system. Understandably, the Budapest correspondent of  a foreign newspaper might 
write about only one outrageous measure without putting the event into the whole context 
of 	Orbán’s	system.	An	international	organization	or	a	foreign	government	might	be	justified	
in	protesting	against	a	specific	measure	taken	by	the	Hungarian	government,	and	in	trying	
to	exert	its	influence	to	have	this	measure	modified	or	withdrawn.	This	paper	is	intended	to	
help both those who form public opinion abroad and those who plan and implement global 
measures that concern Hungary to better understand that more is at stake than a momentary 
event: this is now a strongly forged system, whose essential properties cannot be altered by 
partial	modifications.
 Another intellectual fallacy is the faulty evaluation of  the legitimacy of  the Orbán 
government. “Although I don’t like what is taking place in Hungary, it seems to be what the 
Hungarians	want.”	This	opinion	is	further	reinforced	by	the	official	propaganda,	which	is	
busy announcing that the regime won a two-thirds majority for two successive parliamentary 
cycles; there is no other government in Europe that enjoys such strong support. Yet let us 
take a closer look at the facts.
Table 1. Results of  parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2014: share of  Fidesz–
KDNP supporters and mandates
Parliamentary 
election
Fidesz voters Fidesz deputies
As a proportion of all 
the people entitled to 
vote
As a proportion of all 
voters
As a proportion of all 
deputies
2010 41.5% 53.1% 68.1%
2014 26.6% 44.9% 66.8%
Source: The aggregate numbers of  votes and mandates published by Nemzeti Választási Iroda (National 
Election	Office—2010a,	2010b,	2014).The	2014	results	are	calculated	including	ballots	cast	abroad	(in	2010,	
dual	citizens	without	permanent	Hungarian	residency	were	unable	to	vote).	The	figure	in	the	second	row	of 	
the	first	column	is	an	estimate	calculated	by	the	research	institute	Political	Capital	(see	László	and	Krekó	2014).
 At the last election only every fourth person entitled to vote expressed the wish 
that Viktor Orbán and his party should govern the country. The others either voted for 
another political faction or expressed their weariness and disappointment in politics by ab-
staining. Perhaps some people wished to indicate by staying away that they found the regime 
repellent, but they did not believe that their vote would bring about any change. Political 
legitimacy is not a binary variable: no government is simply either legitimate or not—but 
measured against the continuous scale of  legitimacy, support for the Hungarian government 
is low. The election system itself, introduced after the change of  regime, has offered the op-
portunity for a considerable difference between actual political support and the proportions 
among the representatives.2 That gap has further widened as since the 2010 elections the 
2 About half  of  the seats are divided among the parties in direct relation to the proportion of  the votes. 
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electoral	laws	have	been	modified	seven	times.	While	Fidesz	lost	more	than	half 	a	million	
votes, and the fraction of  all eligible voters who voted for Fidesz dropped from one third to 
a quarter, the regime used legal tricks to maintain a proportion of  deputies which is higher 
than the critical minimum needed to pass laws requiring a two-thirds majority.3
 At the 2010 elections Fidesz won the safe two thirds majority necessary for amend-
ing the constitution and passing laws of  outstanding importance. Although the 2014 elec-
tions ensured that the party had a simple majority, with which it could comfortably pass 
laws of  less importance, winning a two-thirds’ majority was a close call. Not long before the 
completion of  this study the two thirds’ majority was lost. A seat previously held by Fidesz 
fell vacant because its occupant was given another position, and at the by-elections held to 
fill	the	post	the	independent	candidate	supported	by	the	opposition	won.
 It is worth paying attention not only to the parliamentary proportions, but also to 
the changes in public opinion. According to monthly surveys, at the end of  2014 and the 
beginning	of 	2015	Fidesz	lost	several	hundred	thousand	potential	voters.	All	this	questions	
the validity of  the notion quoted above, that ‘it seems to be what Hungarians want’.
 Another intellectual trap, one that is connected to the misinterpretations that I have 
just mentioned, is often expressed thusly: “While it is true that the Fidesz regime has abol-
ished many democratic achievements, the present form of  government must still be con-
sidered a democracy.” At this point the debate about what we call “democracy” begins. 
There is no consensus between academic political philosophers and political scientists. The 
terminology used by people who are actively engaged in politics is interwoven with elements 
of  political rhetoric. Where the term “democracy” is an honor, the status of  democracy is 
awarded or denied to the Hungarian form of  government by the journalist, political analyst, 
politician or diplomat according to whether they hold a favorable or an unfavorable opinion 
of  the present Hungarian system. The terminological confusion remains even when “de-
mocracy”	receives	a	defining	attributive.	The	expression	“illiberal	democracy”	was	originally	
introduced to political science with pejorative connotations, while Viktor Orbán uses the 
term “illiberal state” with self-assured pride to describe his own system.
 Let us look at the set of  previous and present historical forms of  government that 
have	characterized	recent	history.	In	one	group	we	find	democracies. Members of  the European 
Union before its expansion, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland surely 
belong to this group, and as far as this article is concerned the question of  which other coun-
tries might also belong can be left open for the time being. What is sure is that the essential 
common features exist not only in theoretical texts, but can actually be experienced. “Checks 
The	other	half 	are	allocated	in	every	constituency	following	the	“winner	takes	all”	or	“first	past	the	post”	
principle best known in the British system. This secures a large number of  seats for a party that has only a 
small relative advantage over their rivals in several districts.
3	Compare	these	figures	with	German	data	from	2013.	The	CDU/CSU	received	29.7	per	cent	of 	the	vote	
(41.5	per	cent	of 	those	eligible	actually	voted).	This	is	only	slightly	lower	than	the	Fidesz	results.	But	the	
actual proportions of  votes are represented by parliamentary proportions in the Bundestag. Thus, Merkel did 
not have a majority, and a coalition with the Social Democrats is governing that country.
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and balances” are not merely requirements supported by arguments put forward by political 
philosophers—they really do exist, and their functioning can be experienced by observation. 
We can say the same about respect for minority rights; there are written and unwritten limits 
to what the majority, however large it may be, can do against the will of  the minority. We 
could go on listing other important common features.
 In the group at the opposite extreme we have dictatorships. For me, and for several 
hundred million other people, this is no abstract theoretical concept: it is a cruel, person-
ally experienced reality. Thirty years ago 28 countries belonged to one kind of  dictatorship: 
totalitarian communism.
 In between the two extremes, lies a subset of  countries that are neither democracies 
nor dictatorships, though they bear characteristic features of  both. In my own work I have 
joined other authors in calling them autocracies.4 This class is made up of  a colorful multitude: 
I	would	place	 in	 it	 the	pre-war	 regimes	of 	 the	Hungarian	 regent	Miklós	Horthy	and	 the	
Polish statesman Jozef  Pilsudsky, or that of  the Argentinean president Juan Domingo Peron 
in the post-war era. In our own time, besides the Russian president Vladimir Putin, the lead-
ers of  Belarus and many Central Asian post-soviet states rule over countries belonging to 
this subset.
 I believe that under Viktor Orbán Hungary has moved from the subset of  democra-
cies into the subset of  autocracies. I am not talking in the future tense, about the danger of  
the country becoming an autocracy. The move has already taken place.
 To consider Orbán a dictator would be to misunderstand the present Hungarian 
situation. Hungary today has a multi-party system, opposition parties function legally, news-
papers opposing the government can be published. Political opponents are not imprisoned 
en masse, nor are they liquidated. We know all too well what real dictatorship is; we have ex-
perienced it, and what we are experiencing now is different. However, to believe that Orbán 
is the leader of  a democracy, and that although he breaks the rules of  democracy from time 
to time, in the end he still behaves like a democrat, would also be a misunderstanding. I do 
not even want to raise the question of  whether Orbán, in the depths of  his heart, is a true 
democrat or not. This may be an important question for his future biographer, but it is irrel-
evant for our analysis. We have to investigate what has actually already happened. And what 
has already happened is enough for us to say that Hungary now belongs to the wide subset 
of  autocratic countries that are “neither democracies nor dictatorships.”
 It would be a mistake to believe that Orbán is copying Putin. All autocracies are built 
on different historical traditions; they have emerged in different domestic and international 
environments, and the personalities and aspirations of  their highest leaders differ. Orbán is 
not an imitator of  others, he is a self-determining personality. This does not alter the fact 
that both the Putin and the Orbán regimes belong to the same subset of  autocracies.
4 In the related debates in Hungary, referring mostly to international sources, diverse terms have been in use: 
for example, “managed democracy,” “Führer-democracy,” or “elected despotism.”
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	 Hungary	is	the	first	of 	the	post-socialist	democracies	that	has	joined	the	autocracies,	
but there is no guarantee that it will be the only one. The balance of  power might shift in 
other countries in such a way as to turn them into autocracies. There are foreign politicians 
who see Orbán as a model; there is a real danger that this contagion, leading to the loss of  
democracy and of  the rule of  law, will spread.
4. The dangers of  nationalism and the “peacock dance”
One of  the sources of  Viktor Orbán’s support is the fact that many see him as the staunch 
defender of  the sovereignty of  the Hungarian state, and of  Hungary’s independence. 
However, anyone who wishes to understand the Hungarian situation must realize that the 
problem cannot be shrugged off  by simply labeling Orbán a nationalist.
 Worldwide, we can see two opposing tendencies. Globalization, the internet, the 
technical ease with which we travel, the emergence of  transnational integration are all mak-
ing the world more international. At the same time, national sentiments within the boundar-
ies of  a nation-state or in communities which reach beyond national frontiers but use a com-
mon language, and share common historical traditions, still persist; indeed, they are growing 
ever-stronger.
 The change of  regime not only brought about internal regeneration, but also co-
incided	with	the	restoration	of 	Hungarian	sovereignty.	“Russians	go	home!”	was	the	first	
slogan; a happy separation from the East, an expectant turn towards the West. Western 
exports	and	imports	were	becoming	more	and	more	significant.	Plenty	of 	foreign	capital	
was	flowing	into	the	country.	Hungary	joined	NATO	in	1999,	and	became	a	member	of 	the	
European	Union	in	2004.	In	both	cases,	the	intention	to	join	was	confirmed	by	a	referen-
dum, and in the campaigns leading up to these all the parliamentary parties, Fidesz among 
them, encouraged their followers to support the move. Although counter-opinions have 
always been present and voiced, for twenty years the direction of  changes in foreign policy 
remained clear. Hungary must be an organic part of  Europe: it must unambiguously belong 
to the Western world; it must further strengthen the links binding it politically, economically 
and culturally to the West.
 2010 saw the beginning of  a peculiar U-turn in this area as well: clarity has been 
replaced	by	ambiguity.	This	emerges	mostly	in	the	rhetoric	of 	official	statements.	Leading	
politicians grieve at public meetings about the crisis of  world-wide capitalism and Western 
civilization. The leaders of  the regime make use of  the anti-EU, anti-American atmosphere; 
sometimes they go as far as to compare directives from Brussels with the pre-1989 dictates 
of  Moscow. But if  yesterday there was talk of  the emasculation of  the West and of  the great 
things to be expected from the East, today’s discourse will be just the opposite. Orbán is 
proud of  his Janus-face, and considers it a sign of  his political shrewdness.5 The content and 
5 Viktor Orbán (2012) said the following: “There is a dance routine in international diplomacy. This dance, 
this peacock dance […] has to be performed as if  we wanted to be friendly. These are, let’s say, exercises 
in the art of  diplomacy. So we accept two or three out of  seven proposals, those two or three that we have 
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tone of  the words change, depending on whether they are intended for the Party faithful or 
businessmen attending conferences in Munich or Vienna.6 It is hardly surprising that both 
followers and opponents, both Hungarian and foreign observers, are mightily confused.
	 In	the	world	of 	foreign	policy	and	diplomacy	official	or	semi-official	statements	can	
carry a lot of  weight. Hungary is still member of  NATO and the European Union; there 
has never been the slightest hint of  any intention to leave either body.7 The Hungarian 
government	is	happy	to	receive	the	plentiful	financial	support	that	flows	from	the	EU;	the	
only thing it insists on is full control over its distribution.8 (We have already mentioned the 
real motivating forces and intentions which govern state allocations.) At the same time the 
representatives of  the ruling political regime regularly support Euro-skeptic declarations.
 The Hungarian diplomatic corps resolutely attempts (without much success) to es-
tablish business relations with various Asian autocracies and dictatorships, from Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Arab Sheikdoms to Vietnam and China, pointing out that 
other countries do the same. This is purely about business; taking a stand for democracy and 
human rights is another issue. But they sometimes “rise above” this point: recently Orbán 
called	Azerbaijan	a	“model	state”	when	its	dictator	was	on	an	official	visit	to	Budapest.
 Understandably, other countries take the keenest interest in Hungarian-Russian rela-
tions. As we noted earlier, the present Hungarian and Russian forms of  government share 
several features; in this respect both regimes belong to the same subset of  autocracies. But 
now we are not focusing on this similarity, but on the economic connections and relations in 
foreign affairs between tiny Hungary and huge Russia. In this relationship, how far can the 
sovereignty of  Hungary be maintained; to what degree is it committed now and in the future 
to its Russian partner? The corollary is another question: how far do these present tenden-
cies endanger Hungary’s commitment to the European Union, to NATO, to the Western 
world?
 In order to be able to answer the question, we would need, for example, to know 
more of  the conditions under which in January 2014 the Hungarian and Russian govern-
ments reached an agreement over the expansion of  the largest Hungarian power plant, 
followed already, except they didn’t notice, and we reject the remaining two we didn’t want, saying ‘C’mon, 
we have accepted the other ones.’ This is a complicated game. Unless you insist, I’d rather refrain from 
entertaining you with the beauty of  the details.”
6 A characteristic scene of  the “peacock dance” is the duplicity shown by Fidesz and the government towards 
people of  Jewish faith. More than once the government has emphatically declared that it will not tolerate 
anti-Semitism, and if  necessary it will defend its Jewish citizens against any kind of  attack. At the same time 
several government measures gravely insult the painful historical memories of  Hungarian Jews. For example, 
it is falsely suggested in various ways that the deportation of  hundreds of  thousands of  Hungarian Jews was 
forcibly imposed by Nazi Germany, while in fact Horthy’s state machinery was actively involved in it.
7 A noteworthy exception: the Speaker of  the Parliament, a founding member of  Fidesz, at one point 
publicly referred to the possibility of  “backing out” of  the EU.
8 The	spectacular	new	projects	inaugurated	with	pompous	ceremonies	by	political	leaders	are	mostly	financed	
by the European Union or multinational companies.
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the Paks nuclear power station. I am not in a position to judge whether this large-scale ex-
pansion	of 	Hungarian	nuclear	power	capacity	is	justified,	and	if 	it	is,	whether	the	Russian	
proposal	was	the	most	advantageous	in	technical,	financial,	and	geopolitical	terms	of 	the	
possible alternatives. What many people in Hungary and abroad object to, and with good 
reason, is the way in which the decision was made. It was not preceded by public debate 
among experts; the government’s plans were pushed through the parliamentary law factory 
without the least publicity. In this crucial issue, which will have a deep impact on the lives of  
many future generations, on European integration, on the foreign affairs of  the country, on 
its commitments to its allies, the government confronted the public with a fait accompli.9
	 Reflecting	on	the	relationship	between	Hungary	and	other	countries,	the	following	
question must be considered: what can Hungarians who worry about the U-turn, who fear 
for democracy, for the rule of  law and for human rights expect from their foreign friends? 
A new development may be followed by cries of: “the West won’t put up with any more of  
this.” I am afraid many people nourish false hopes. The learning process is painfully slow; it 
takes years for foreign observers to realize there is anything wrong, and even longer before 
they put the different elements of  the phenomenon into the right context. And comprehen-
sion is only the beginning; what else is also needed if  awareness is to be followed by some 
kind of  action? This is a task with which international organizations are unfamiliar; they 
are at loss as to how an allied state can be forced to abide by the rules of  democracy. Not 
many means are available. The European Union is unprepared for a situation where one of  
its members keeps turning against the value system and formal and informal norms of  its 
community.10 And let us not forget that Hungary is only one small point on the map of  the 
world;	conflicting	agendas	influence	the	motion	of 	political	forces.	The	special	interests	of 	
countries, political groups, social classes and professions pull the main actors in many dif-
ferent directions. Threatening situations more pressing than that of  Hungary have proved 
impossible to solve by peaceful agreements.
5. The “ideological” sphere
9 The Paks power plant is not the only case where this problem has arisen. All too frequently the 
government,	without	proper	reason,	classifies	some	procedure	as	secret,	and	in	more	than	one	case	it	has	
greatly lengthened the period of  secrecy, thus preventing any open debate and ruling out transparency in 
public affairs.
10 The Tavares Report commissioned by the European Parliament points out that the “reforms” introduced 
in Hungary since 2010 do not observe the shared fundamental principles and values of  the EU, especially the 
basic requirements of  democracy, rule of  law and division of  the branches of  power, although it would be 
the duty based on the EU treaty of  all member states to observe these. Among the many problems, which 
are discussed in great detail in the report, the new electoral laws appear as well. The report suggests that a 
monitoring process should be worked out, not only for Hungary but for other countries failing to meet the 
European norms as well. This process would reveal problems facilitate reparatory measures (see European 
Parliament	2013).	The	Tavares	Report	drew	attention	to	the	problem,	but	it	was	not	followed	by	any	efficient	
EU measures.
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I have left the survey of  the changes which have taken place in the “ideological sphere” to 
the end. A fundamental characteristic of  communist dictatorship is the existence of  an “of-
ficial	ideology.”	The	roots	of 	its	ideological	history	go	back	to	Marx	and	Lenin,	its	terminol-
ogy comes from the language of  Marxist-Leninist party seminars. The communist party kept 
it up-to-date, and adapted it to the propaganda needs of  whichever party line prevailed at the 
time. The citizen, especially the “cadre” with a role in the system, was obliged to accept the 
ideology; he had to articulate it both verbally and in writing.
Following	the	fall	of 	the	old	regime,	the	dominance	of 	“official	ideology”	was	re-
placed by pluralism in the ideological world. But we can observe a U-turn here too. The 
government now strives to limit and discredit the principle of  pluralism. It tries to force on 
society those theories, beliefs, and norms of  behavior that are part and parcel of  its accept-
able dogma.
First of  all, it aggressively established institutions that promote the execution of  
the central will. For the world of  artists, pluralism and diversity are essential elements. 
Accordingly, in free societies many kinds of  associations and unions, schools and groups co-
exist	side	by	side,	competing	or	even	fighting	with	each	other.	The	regime	that	seized	power	
in 2010 selected a small group and endowed it with powers that would be unimaginable in 
the West. Their main organization is the Hungarian Academy of  Arts (Magyar Művészeti 
Akadémia). Other organizations and groups do still exist, but the name of  this privileged 
body appears even in the constitution. It was given one of  the most beautiful palaces in the 
capital as its headquarters, and made responsible for distributing the majority of  publicly-
funded cultural grants, as well as most of  the awards and marks of  recognition that are ac-
companied	by	financial	benefits.
In	the	scientific	world,	the	situation	is	similar.	The	Hungarian	Academy	of 	Sciences	
boasts a long history, and although its independence was severely curtailed by the party state 
under communism, its autonomy strengthened after the change of  regime. It used to exer-
cise	considerable	influence	over	decisions	about	which	research	projects	should	be	funded	
by the state, through an institution which, like the American National Science Foundation, 
relied on expert opinion. But the long arm of  centralization has reached this institution, 
too.	The	National	Innovation	Office	(Nemzeti	Kutatási,	Fejlesztési	és	Innovációs	Hivatal),	a	
leading	state	organization,	was	established.	The	Academy	and	other	scientific	organizations	
might	try	to	express	their	opinion	before	final	decisions	are	taken,	but	the	days	of 	a	decen-
tralized, professional, and civil approach to funding allocations are over—the president of  
the	office	has	sovereign	decision-making	powers.	And	who	is	that	president?	None	other	
than	the	minister	of 	education	from	the	first	Orbán	government.
Turning to the sphere of  education: the change of  regime made the emergence of  a 
real text-book market possible. The writers and publishers of  school books could compete 
with each other; schools, or even individual teachers, could decide which books to use. Right 
now, competition is being abolished here too: a mammoth state text-book publishing house 
has been set up and granted what is effectively a near-monopoly.
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What ideas is this increasingly centralized, nationalized, standardized machinery try-
ing to promote? A return to the past is perceptible here too; not to the previous regime 
with	 its	Marxist-Leninist	 ideology,	but	 to	an	earlier	 ideological	past.	The	official	 ideas	of 	
the	pre-1945	Horthy	period	are	being	revived	in	various	forms,	with	increasing	strength.	It	
is inadequate to describe these with a handful of  concise expressions such as nationalism, 
chauvinism, ethnic or religious prejudice or a conservative view of  the family, because they 
appear	in	a	variety	of 	shades.	Official	politicians	never	make	open	and	extreme	declarations	
that would offend the ears of  the civilized world; there are, rather, many covert hints and 
indirect expressions. But in that muted music, the marching tune for boots can be heard. To 
the ears of  my generation the sound is familiar and frightening.
The images of  cultural and academic life and of  the world of  ideas that I have 
highlighted here dovetail with the general description of  the present-day Hungarian system, 
which was summarized in an earlier section of  this article. This sphere too bears the mark 
of  an in-between state that is “neither democracy nor dictatorship.” The regime is trying to 
encroach in an increasingly aggressive fashion. Luckily there are large numbers of  writers, 
poets,	musicians,	film-makers,	artists,	scientists,	teachers	and	free-thinking	intellectuals	who	
will not allow themselves either to be intimidated or bought by money and rewards, and who 
protect their intellectual autonomy. Any visitor to Hungary can testify that intellectual life is 
thriving:	great	artistic	works	are	born	and	significant	scientific	advances	are	made.
6. Potential future scenarios
After the description of  the Hungarian situation in the preceding sections, I wish to add a 
few	personal	comments.	A	number	of 	the	first	readers	of 	the	manuscript	of 	this	study	asked	
the same question: why do I not discuss the antecedents of  the U-turn? Why do I not reveal 
the causes of  the reversal?
 I realize that there were several important factors behind the reversal: the grave mis-
takes made by the governments and the political parties functioning within and outside the 
parliament between 1990 and 2010, the spread of  corruption, the trauma caused by the ap-
pearance of  mass unemployment, the increase of  social inequality, and the disappointment 
of  a large proportion of  the population after the high expectations brought by the change 
of  system. The maturation of  democracy is a long historical process, and Hungary has only 
just begun.
 I also know that if  the causes are to be explained, we must go further back than 
1990,	to	the	time	of 	the	change	of 	system.	We	would	have	to	dig	deeper	into	the	final	period	
of  Hungarian socialism, which the West called “goulash-communism”, when the population 
became accustomed to the paternalism of  a heavy-handed regime.
 An even deeper, older layer of  historical memory which shapes today’s way of  think-
ing is the nationalist, racist, anti-Semitic ideology of  the autocracy of  the Horthy period of  
1919	to	1945,	with	its	foreign	policy	that	prioritized	the	revision	of 	the	unjust	dismember-
ment of  the country after the First World War, turning Hungary into a loyal ally—to the 
Kornai: Hungary’s U-Turn
20
bitter end—of  Hitler. And we could go on digging ever deeper, investigating contradictory 
historical traditions that reach back over centuries.
 It is not my habit to deal with very complex issues in one or two paragraphs. I prefer 
to say quite frankly to the reader: do not expect from me here, in this paper, a discussion of  
the antecedents of  the present regime. The answer to my readers’ question would require at 
the very least another separate study, certainly no shorter than the present paper. The best 
person to write such an article would be a competent Hungarian historian, familiar with 
political philosophy, political science, and economics, who has a profound knowledge of  the 
past and a keen interest in the present; somebody like Tony Judt, whose books and essays are 
well known to the American intelligentsia and to many other readers throughout the world.
 Another issue raised by several early readers is why I merely list the problems: why 
do I not outline the steps that should be taken to overcome them? One physician carries out 
tests using MRI or PET imaging technology, and can establish with a fair degree of  certainty 
whether there is a tumor in the patient’s body and, if  so, where it is located. Usually, however, 
it is another physician, or a whole team, who will determine what therapy should be applied, 
assess the possible risks and side-effects, decide whether the growth should be removed by 
surgery or treated with radiation or chemotherapy, or whether there is no hope of  saving the 
patient and palliative care is the best course of  action. In this study, I am trying to provide a 
diagnosis. I dare only go this far—no further. Giving political advice is a special profession, 
which requires different points of  view (“Realpolitik”…). It works according to different 
norms: it may be expedient to offer a distorted image of  reality, to cover up problems in 
order to obtain or hold onto power, or to win supporters, admirers, and followers.
 When I was giving lectures in the USA on the delicate and complicated situation of  
the post-socialist transition, I was always asked the question: what should be done? What can 
we, your friends, living far away from your region, do? I admire and respect this readiness to 
act, but it is not my task to answer the question. My paper is only intended to reveal the situa-
tion: I wished to contribute to our American and other foreign friends’ better understanding 
of  the Hungarian case.
 What does the future hold for Hungary? One of  the theories of  democracy deserves 
close attention. It does not dwell on how far a certain form of  government expresses “the 
will of  the people,” or at least of  the majority. It considers democracy primarily as a procedure 
(Schumpeter 2010 [1942], Dahl 1971, Huntington 1991, Kornai 1998). Among its several 
important characteristics let me highlight one: the democratic procedure makes the dismissal 
of  a government possible, not through the murder of  a tyrant, and not through conspiracy, 
military coup d’etat, or bloody popular uprising, but rather in a peaceful and civilized way, 
through	elections	which	are	well-defined	in	legal	terms	and	include	a	plurality	of 	competing	
parties.	The	feasibility	of 	dismissal	is	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	a	viable	democracy,	but	
it is a necessary one.
 It will be some time before we can say for sure whether this minimum condition 
is met or not. In Sweden it was forty years before the social-democratic government was 
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dismissed at the 1976 elections. In Britain the conservative party ruled for eighteen years, 
from	1979	to	1997,	before	being	voted	out	of 	office.	In	both	cases	the	winners	of 	a	political	
competition carried out in a democratic procedure based on fair election rules—offering a 
chance for victory to all parties—replaced the former government. The historians of  the 
future	will	give	a	final	answer	to	the	question	of 	whether	the	minimum	condition	of 	democ-
racy described above—namely, dismissal of  the government by election—is met in Hungary 
or not.
 The outlook is bleak. Viktor Orbán and his party have “cemented themselves in,” to 
translate	an	expression	which	has	become	commonplace	in	Hungary.	The	repeated	modifi-
cations made to election laws were intended to favor a Fidesz victory, or rather, to make it 
an almost absolute certainty.11
 Fidesz is prepared for the unlikely but not impossible event of  its failing to win a 
parliamentary	majority	in	the	next	elections.	The	32	cardinal	laws	can	only	be	modified	by	
a two thirds parliamentary majority, and even in the case of  Fidesz’ electoral defeat no such 
majority would be possible without their participation.12 The mandates of  many key posi-
tions, most importantly those of  the chief  prosecutor, president of  the republic, head of  
the	central	bank,	of 	the	audit	office,	and	of 	the	judicial	office,	extend	beyond	the	current	
parliamentary	cycle;	they	can	all	sit	tight,	even	if 	the	opposition	wins.	The	fiscal	council,	a	
body	appointed	by	the	present	government,	but	which	would	remain	in	office	even	in	case	
of  an election defeat, has not only an advisory role but also the right of  veto over the budget 
submitted by a new government. If  that veto is used, the president of  the republic may dis-
solve the parliament and call for new elections. In other words, a few hand-picked men loyal 
to the present government would be able to overturn the next government.
 All of  this leads to the logical conclusion that it would probably be extremely dif-
ficult	 to	 effectively	 dismiss	 the	 government	 at	 parliamentary	 elections.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
situation that has emerged is nearly irreversible. Historical experience shows that an autoc-
racy can only be brought down by an “earthquake” that rocks the very foundations of  the 
system.
 Other future scenarios are also possible. The great events of  history cannot be pre-
dicted on the basis of  mathematical probabilities; every constellation is unique and unrepeat-
able. The situation could become much worse than it is today. The present Fidesz autocracy 
could react to the growing protests by hardening the repression, taking the path followed by 
the Turkish government. Or another succession of  events is also possible. Jobbik, the party 
11	As	we	have	mentioned	earlier,	in	a	February	2015	by-election	an	independent	candidate	was	elected	in	the	
place of  the previous Fidesz representative, and with this the two-thirds majority of  the reigning party was 
lost. Although this is an important change, the Fidesz spokesmen claim, not without a reason, that they still 
have	a	firm	grip	on	power.
12	Orbán	said	in	an	early	interview	after	taking	office:	“I	will	expand	the	circle	of 	two-thirds	laws	only	at	
one	point:	in	the	field	of 	economic	legislation.	And	let	me	make	no	secret	of 	the	fact	that	I	would	like	to	
tie the hands of  the next government in this regard. And not only that of  the next, but of  the following ten 
governments” (Orbán, 2011).
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of 	the	extreme	right,	already	represents	a	significant	force;	more	than	one	city	has	elected	its	
candidates as mayors. They speak undisturbed in parliament and in the street. What would 
happen if  in a future election Fidesz did not manage to win a parliamentary majority? Would 
they be prepared to form a coalition with the extreme right? There is a historical precedent: 
towards the end of  the Weimar republic the moderate right-wing conservative party en-
tered into a coalition with Hitler’s party; together they constituted a parliamentary majority 
(Wittenberg 2013, Bugarič 2014).
 At the same time, favorable scenarios are not impossible. What if  more moderate 
groups within the ruling party begin to get the upper hand, groups who are ready to stop 
moving along the wrong track and are willing to turn back in the direction of  democracy 
and the rule of  law? What if  the opposition, parties, and civil movements pull themselves 
together? What if  new political groups and movements emerge and win over millions? What 
if  somehow, in spite of  an electoral system which almost guarantees the defeat of  future 
democratic forces, the tables turn?
 Let us not give up hope.
References
Barnes, Andrew and Johnson, Juliet (2014), “Financial nationalism and its international en-
ablers: The Hungarian experience,” Review of  International Political Economy, published 
online: May 22, 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09692290.20
14.919336?journalCode=rrip20#.VPRBPuHNvF9.
Bozóki,	 András	 (2012),	The Illusion of  Inclusion: Configurations of  Populism in Hungary, EUI 
Working Paper SPS 2012/06, Department of  Political and Social Sciences, 
European University Institute, Florence, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/26934/EUI_SPS_2012_06.pdf?sequence=1.
Bugarič, Bojan (2014), Protecting Democracy and the Rule of  Law in the European Union: The 
Hungarian Challenge, LSE “Europe in Question” Discussion Paper Series, LEQS 
Paper	No.	79/2014,	accessed	January	28,	2015,	http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanIn-
stitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper79.pdf.
Dahl, Robert A. (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
European Parliament (2013), “Report on the situation of  fundamental rights: standards and 
practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of  16 February 
2012),”	A7-0229/2013,	25	June	2013,	Committee	on	Civil	Liberties,	Justice	and	Home	
Capitalism and Society, Vol. 10 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
23
Affairs, rapporteur: Rui Tavares, accessed October 31, 2014. http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0229+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
Halmai, Gábor (2014), “An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of  Europe,” Journal 
of  Human Rights 01/2014.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman and London: University of  Oklahoma Press.
Kornai, János (1998), From Socialism to Capitalism: What is Meant by the “Change of  System?”, 
London: The Social Market Foundation, Centre for Post-Collectivist Studies.
Kornai, János (2011), “Taking Stock,” CESifo Forum 12 (2), 63–72, http://www.cesifo-group.
de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1211471.pdf.
László,	 Róbert	 and	Krekó,	 Péter	 (2014),	 “A	Fidesz	 támogatottságának	 változása	 három-
szor három választás során” [Changes in support for the Fidesz–KDNP coalition 
through three rounds of  three elections], background analysis, manuscript, Budapest: 
Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute.
Magyar, Bálint and Vásárhelyi, Júlia, eds. (2013 [Vol. 1], 2014 [Vol. 2]), Magyar polip – a po-
sztkommunista maffiaállam [Hungarian	Octopus:	The	Post-Communist	Mafia	State],	
Volumes 1 and 2, Budapest: Noran Libro.
Nemzeti	 Választási	 Iroda—	 Hungary’s	 National	 Election	 Office	 (2010a),	 “Adatok	 a	
FIDESZ–KDNP eredményeiről” [Data on results of  Parliamentary Election 
2010:	 Fidesz–KDNP],	 accessed	 February	 27,	 2015,	 http://valasztas.hu/hu/par-
val2010/354/354_0_index.html.
Nemzeti	Választási	Iroda—	Hungary’s	National	Election	Office	(2010b),	“Adatok	a	FIDESZ–
KDNP–Vállakozók	Pártja	eredményeiről” [Data on results of  Parliamentary Election 
2010:	 Fidesz–KDNP–MVMP],	 accessed	 February	 27,	 2015,	 http://valasztas.hu/
hu/parval2010/354/354_0_index.html.
Nemzeti	Választási	Iroda—	Hungary’s	National	Election	Office	(2014),	“A	FIDESZ–KDNP	
eredményei” [Data on results of  Parliamentary Election 2014: Fidesz–KDNP], 
accessed	 February	 27,	 2015,	 http://valasztas.hu//hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_in-
dex.html, http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/nvb/content/kozlemeny/ovb_kozleme-
ny_20100510.pdf.
Kornai: Hungary’s U-Turn
24
Orbán, Viktor (2011), “Orban: ‘Nur toter Fisch schwimmt mit dem Strom’ (Krone-
Interview),” Kronen Zeitung,	 June	 10,	 2011,	 accessed	 February	 27,	 2015,	 http://
www.krone.at/Welt/Orban_Nur_toter_Fisch_schwimmt_mit_dem_Strom-Krone-
Interview-Story-267398.
Orbán,	Viktor	(2012),	“Fókuszban	a	nemzeti	érdek”	[Focussing	on	national	interest]:	Viktor	
Orbán’s speech at the conference held by the foundations Századvég Alapítvány 
and Széll Kálmán Alapítvány, and the publisher of  the weekly Heti Válasz. May 31, 
Budapest,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s5gzvb87ZY.
Scheppele, Kim Lane (2012), “The Unconstitutional Constitution,” posted to Paul Krugman’s 
blog The Conscience of  a Liberal for The New York Times, accessed October 31, 
2014, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/the-unconstitutional-
constitution/#more-27941.
Scheppele, Kim Lane (2013), “Hungary, The Public Relations Offensive,” posted to Paul 
Krugman’s blog The Conscience of  a Liberal for The New York Times, accessed 
October 31, 2014, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/guest-post-
hungary-the-public-relations-offensive/?_r=0#more-34278.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2010 [1942]), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Milton Park: 
Routledge.
Wittenberg, Jason (2013), “Back to the Future? Revolution of  the Right in Hungary,” APSA 
2013	Annual	Meeting	Paper,	American	Political	Science	Association,	December	15,	
2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2299143.
